Sunday, March 16, 2014
Never Set a squadron in field , nor knew division of battle more than a spinster Worlds Future depends on how wise or how Foolish is US Top Leadership ? confrontation with Russia that Washington’s coup in Ukraine has provoked
Worlds Future depends on how wise or how Foolish is US Top Leadership ?
Never Set a squadron in field , nor knew division of battle more than a spinster Worlds Future depends on how wise or how Foolish is US Top Leadership ? confrontation with Russia that Washington’s coup in Ukraine has provoked
Never Set a squadron in field , nor knew division of battle more than a spinster Worlds Future depends on how wise or how Foolish is US Top Leadership ? confrontation with Russia that Washington’s coup in Ukraine has provoked
WORLD WAR 1 ALL OVER AGAIN — PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS
March 14, 2014 | Categories: Articles & Columns | Tags: war, | 
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World War 1 All Over Again
The same fools play the same game
The same fools play the same game
Paul Craig Roberts
“If you reduce the lie to a scientific system put it on thick and heavy, and with great effort and sufficient finances scatter it all over the world as the pure truth, you can deceive whole nations for a long time and drive them to slaughter for causes in which they have not the slightest interest.” — Chief French Editor,Behind the Scenes in French Journalism, describing the organization of World War 1 propaganda in France.
Did US Secretary of State John Kerry ask you before he delivered an all or nothing ultimatum to Russia? Did he ask Congress? Did he ask the countries of western and eastern Europe–NATO members who Kerry has committed to whatever the consequences will be of Washington’s inflexible, arrogant, aggressive provocation of Russia, a well-armed nuclear power? Did Kerry ask Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Mexico, South America, Africa, China, Central Asia, all of whom would be adversely affected by a world war provoked by the crazed criminals in Washington?
No.
He did not.
The exceptional, indispensable, arrogant, self-righteous United States government does not need to ask anyone. Washington speaks not merely for itself. Washington represents the country chosen by history (and the neoconservatives) to speak not merely for itself, but for the entire world.
Whatever Washington says is truth. Whatever Washington does is legal, in accordance with both domestic and international law. When Washington invades countries and destroys them, sends in drones and missiles, blows up people attending weddings, funerals and children’s soccer games, Washington is practicing human rights and bringing democracy to the people. Whenever a country tries to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the country is engaging in terrorism, al-Qaeda connections, human rights violations, and suppressing democracy.
We are watching this audacity play out now in the confrontation with Russia that Washington’s coup in Ukraine has provoked. Obama and Kerry have been advised by the idiots that comprise the US government that Russia will surrender and accept Washington’s will if Washington is sufficiently insistent.
Apparently, no one has asked the advisors what happens if ultimatums are given, and the Russians do not submit.
Did NATO and US Realistically Assess Independent will of te Russian Enemy in Ukrainian Crisis
Did NATO and US Realistically Assess Independent will of the Russian Enemy in Ukrainian Crisis
Can the crisis be kept in control ?????
Does US leadership have strategic talent to deal with a complex situation that may develop ?????
Agha h Amin
Reasons for the “Perception and Reality Gap”
Why this gap? It is so because war and politics are exercises in the field of unknown made further complicated by presence of a large number of other factors. The number of participants in both activities is very large! Thus the difficulty in bridging the gap! Thus the resultant difficulty in forming correct assessments, arriving at correct assessments etc! Some of the reasons which Clausewitz gave may be summarized as following:-
a. There is no theory which can guide the decision maker
War, politics or business in its higher levels is not regulated by any fixed theory unlike tactics or lower level business management! Thus Clausewitz’s saying “The conduct of war has no definite limits in any direction”.11*
b. Distance between point of action and the participant
A participant at a junior level whether a common soldier, subaltern or company commander is close to the point of action. The time frame in which he has to take action is limited. Thus it is easier to win an MC or be dismissed for cowardice than to win a war or to be exposed as an incompetent C in C!
c. Speed of development of situation
In strategy things move at a far more slower pace than tactics. The decision maker whether he is an army C in C or a corps commander does not have to perform a mechanical reaction like firing or advancing or withdrawing or offering a sale package. He has to plan days months and sometimes years in advance. Thus the profound truth in Clausewitz’s saying “Much more strength of will is required to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics. In the latter we are hurried on with the moment; a commander feels himself borne along in a strong current against which he does not contend without the most destructive consequences, he suppresses the rising fears and boldly ventures farther. In Strategy where all goes on at a slower rate, there is more room allowed for our own apprehensions and those of others, for objections and remonstrances, consequently also for unseasonable regrets; and as we do not see things in strategy as we do at least half of them in tactics, with the living eye, but everything must be conjectured and assumed, the convictions thus produced are less powerful. The consequence is that most generals when they should act, remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts”.
d. Degree of stress involved
The degree of stress involved in war business and politics is much higher with war being at the top and business being the second.
e. The intangible concept of “Friction”
The discovery as well as coining of the term “Friction” was one of the greatest contributions of Clausewitz to military and political thought. “Friction” as per Clausewitz was an invisible but ever present factor that reduces speed of activity in war. Friction being the sum of confusion, fear, indecision, incompetence faulty execution or misunderstanding of orders, bad weather, loss of commanders in fighting etc. Friction thus makes even simple movements like walking, walking in water. This “friction” leads to events “which it was impossible to calculate”.
f. Imperfection of Human Perception
Human perception is not perfect. A decision maker has to make assessments without seeing things. A decision maker is neither a magician nor a prophet. Thus perceptions can be wrong.
g. Moral Qualities cannot be measured
Moral qualities cannot be measured. No military commander can predict whether the enemy in front will resist or bolt away, Bravery, Boldness, Cowardice, Presence of Mind, etc can neither be measured nor forecasted. The army has some systems but these are crude. All who pass out of the military academy successfully box well, pass the physical tests and written examinations. The ISSB assesses a candidate in three or five days while an instructor of cadets assesses cadets in two years. Even then the human character is so complicated that many who reach higher positions do it by dodging the system while in reality they never deserved what they got. Hence the Mc Clellans, Hookers, Naseers and Niazis.
h. Presence of Intelligent Forces which oppose the decision maker
The opposing forces are equally or unevenly intelligent. There are Fords opposed by GM and other tycoons. There is the Security Agency “Alpha” opposed by Security Agency “Bravo”. A Napoleon opposed by a Blucher. A Jinnah opposed by a Mountbatten or Nehru!
i.. Incompetence of own decision makers at various levels of command
Faulty execution at lower levels of command in all three spheres i.e. war, politics and business can lead to failure or faulty assessments.
j. Want of Resolution
An important factor whose absence or presence can lead to failure or success. What would have happened if the Pakistani 1 Corps was led by a man of Eftikhar’s calibre or if the 23 Division in Chamb was led by a man like General Irshad or the Eastern Command by someone other than A.A.K Niazi. In Battle of Gazala in 1942 at one point General Westphal writes in his book “The German Army in the West” all of Rommel’s major staff officers and subsidiary commanders thought of surrender. This was the “Cauldron Battle”. Westphal writes that Rommel dismissed all these suggestions with scorn. In the end Gazala was a German victory! Replace Rommel by individual “X” and Gazala rather than Alalamein may have been the most decisive battle of the North African War in WW Two.
How to bridge the “Perception and Reality Gap”
What is the solution to the dilemma! The following may to some extent compensate:-
The Relative Importance of Theory vis-a-vis Individual talent of a commander
a. Theory to a relative factor has a limited value. Theory must educate the leader but it must not provide cut and dried solutions. We can conveniently fall back to Clausewitz who gave an answer “given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Wherever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice”.12 Thus Clausewitz recognises theorie’s importance but tells us that in the final outcome the real decision requires talent and theory in itself affords no answer. The best solution is to “identify talent” and to groom it. Clausewitz thus stated “to indicate the point at which all lines converge, but never to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield”. Clausewitz gave us a precise solution to this highly complex problem when he said “Even these principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out” and not “to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take”.13 The greatness of the German General Staff as I wrote in an article in 1994 was not that it produced a Manstein but that it discovered a Manstein and groomed him. In the final analysis organizations have to surrender to the judgement of one man. This can lead to both success or failure. The risk has to be taken.
b. The German General Halder well summed it up when he said “War is full of imponderables and surprises. Only a commander who can depend on his own ingenuity and that of his men will be able to make the improvisations dictated by the moment and master situations not described in the manuals”. Halder went further adding “True, in order to do this, he will have to know exactly what it is he wants to do....”. Thus Halder concluded “The attempt to find a recipe for every single situation with which the lower echelons may be confronted, occasionally results in a cut-and-dried recipee” far more detailed than is needed”.14 As a matter of fact this is the difference between the British Way of Warfare which both Indian, Pakistani and to a great extent the Bangladesh Army inherited and the German way of warfare. Thus the military failures in 1965, 1971 and later!
c. Creation of systems which assess the decision making capabilities of individuals at higher levels. In third World Countries this is severely limited by powerful interest groups, parochialism and nepotism. Then there is a kinship of higher ranks and they feel that anybody who has reached a particular rank does not require any further testing! In my thirteen years service I highlighted this anomaly in many articles published in the Citadel and Pakistan Army Journal. I don’t think that anyone in the army use to read both of these publications!
CONCLUSION
Its best to quote Clausewitz once again:-
“Searching rather than inventive minds, comprehensive rather than such as have a special bent, cool rather than fiery heads are those to which in time of War we should prefer to trust the welfare of our women and children, the honour and safety of our fatherland”.15 “Men who are difficult to move but on that account susceptible of very deep feeling”. Men the effect of whose feelings is “like the movement of a great body, slower but more irresistible”.16
End Notes
1Pages 127 & 128 -India and the World War One- Edited by S.D Pradhan -Article titled Congress Leadership in Transition by Stanley Wolpert -Columbia University-1978.
2Page-266- Fidelity and Honour-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Viking -New Delhi-1991. Taken from Bernhardi’s book Germany and the next War.
3Page-311 -Mian Fazal I Hussain-A Political Biography- Azim Hussain-London 1966.
4Quoted by Great Captains-Napoleon- Theodore Ayrault Dodge-In Four Volumes-Printed by Mifflin Company-1904-7. The remark was made by General Kellerman.
6Page-150-The Great War at Sea-1914-1918-Richard Hough-Oxford University Press-1986.
7Page-85-Ibid.
8Page-271 & 272-The German Army- Herbert Rosinki- (edited with an introduction by Gordon (Craig)- Pall Mall Press-London-1966.
9Page-260-On War-Carl Von Clausewitz-Edited By Anatol Rapoport. Pelican Books 1976. Reprinted by National Book Foundation on orders of Mr Bhutto and distributed in the army in 1976.
10 Page-198-Ibid.
11Page-182-Ibid.
12Page-140-On War-Carl Von Clausewitz-Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret-Princeton University Press-Princeton-New Jersey-1976. Reprinted by NBF under express instructions of Mr Bhutto in 1976 and distributed in the Armed Forces.
13Page-141-Ibid.
14Pages 8 & 9-Military Effectiveness-Volume Three-Allen and Unwin-USA-1988.
15Page-158 -On War edited by Rapoport.
16Page-149.Ibid.
POSTING THIS DOES NOT MEAN ENDORSEMENT.
COMMENTS ARE WELCOME.
AGHA H AMIN
Can the crisis be kept in control ?????
Does US leadership have strategic talent to deal with a complex situation that may develop ?????
Agha h Amin
Reasons for the “Perception and Reality Gap”
Why this gap? It is so because war and politics are exercises in the field of unknown made further complicated by presence of a large number of other factors. The number of participants in both activities is very large! Thus the difficulty in bridging the gap! Thus the resultant difficulty in forming correct assessments, arriving at correct assessments etc! Some of the reasons which Clausewitz gave may be summarized as following:-
a. There is no theory which can guide the decision maker
War, politics or business in its higher levels is not regulated by any fixed theory unlike tactics or lower level business management! Thus Clausewitz’s saying “The conduct of war has no definite limits in any direction”.11*
b. Distance between point of action and the participant
A participant at a junior level whether a common soldier, subaltern or company commander is close to the point of action. The time frame in which he has to take action is limited. Thus it is easier to win an MC or be dismissed for cowardice than to win a war or to be exposed as an incompetent C in C!
c. Speed of development of situation
In strategy things move at a far more slower pace than tactics. The decision maker whether he is an army C in C or a corps commander does not have to perform a mechanical reaction like firing or advancing or withdrawing or offering a sale package. He has to plan days months and sometimes years in advance. Thus the profound truth in Clausewitz’s saying “Much more strength of will is required to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics. In the latter we are hurried on with the moment; a commander feels himself borne along in a strong current against which he does not contend without the most destructive consequences, he suppresses the rising fears and boldly ventures farther. In Strategy where all goes on at a slower rate, there is more room allowed for our own apprehensions and those of others, for objections and remonstrances, consequently also for unseasonable regrets; and as we do not see things in strategy as we do at least half of them in tactics, with the living eye, but everything must be conjectured and assumed, the convictions thus produced are less powerful. The consequence is that most generals when they should act, remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts”.
d. Degree of stress involved
The degree of stress involved in war business and politics is much higher with war being at the top and business being the second.
e. The intangible concept of “Friction”
The discovery as well as coining of the term “Friction” was one of the greatest contributions of Clausewitz to military and political thought. “Friction” as per Clausewitz was an invisible but ever present factor that reduces speed of activity in war. Friction being the sum of confusion, fear, indecision, incompetence faulty execution or misunderstanding of orders, bad weather, loss of commanders in fighting etc. Friction thus makes even simple movements like walking, walking in water. This “friction” leads to events “which it was impossible to calculate”.
f. Imperfection of Human Perception
Human perception is not perfect. A decision maker has to make assessments without seeing things. A decision maker is neither a magician nor a prophet. Thus perceptions can be wrong.
g. Moral Qualities cannot be measured
Moral qualities cannot be measured. No military commander can predict whether the enemy in front will resist or bolt away, Bravery, Boldness, Cowardice, Presence of Mind, etc can neither be measured nor forecasted. The army has some systems but these are crude. All who pass out of the military academy successfully box well, pass the physical tests and written examinations. The ISSB assesses a candidate in three or five days while an instructor of cadets assesses cadets in two years. Even then the human character is so complicated that many who reach higher positions do it by dodging the system while in reality they never deserved what they got. Hence the Mc Clellans, Hookers, Naseers and Niazis.
h. Presence of Intelligent Forces which oppose the decision maker
The opposing forces are equally or unevenly intelligent. There are Fords opposed by GM and other tycoons. There is the Security Agency “Alpha” opposed by Security Agency “Bravo”. A Napoleon opposed by a Blucher. A Jinnah opposed by a Mountbatten or Nehru!
i.. Incompetence of own decision makers at various levels of command
Faulty execution at lower levels of command in all three spheres i.e. war, politics and business can lead to failure or faulty assessments.
j. Want of Resolution
An important factor whose absence or presence can lead to failure or success. What would have happened if the Pakistani 1 Corps was led by a man of Eftikhar’s calibre or if the 23 Division in Chamb was led by a man like General Irshad or the Eastern Command by someone other than A.A.K Niazi. In Battle of Gazala in 1942 at one point General Westphal writes in his book “The German Army in the West” all of Rommel’s major staff officers and subsidiary commanders thought of surrender. This was the “Cauldron Battle”. Westphal writes that Rommel dismissed all these suggestions with scorn. In the end Gazala was a German victory! Replace Rommel by individual “X” and Gazala rather than Alalamein may have been the most decisive battle of the North African War in WW Two.
How to bridge the “Perception and Reality Gap”
What is the solution to the dilemma! The following may to some extent compensate:-
The Relative Importance of Theory vis-a-vis Individual talent of a commander
a. Theory to a relative factor has a limited value. Theory must educate the leader but it must not provide cut and dried solutions. We can conveniently fall back to Clausewitz who gave an answer “given the nature of the subject, we must remind ourselves that it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Wherever he has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in conflict with it; no matter how versatile the code, the situation will always lead to the consequences we have already alluded to: talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice”.12 Thus Clausewitz recognises theorie’s importance but tells us that in the final outcome the real decision requires talent and theory in itself affords no answer. The best solution is to “identify talent” and to groom it. Clausewitz thus stated “to indicate the point at which all lines converge, but never to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield”. Clausewitz gave us a precise solution to this highly complex problem when he said “Even these principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out” and not “to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take”.13 The greatness of the German General Staff as I wrote in an article in 1994 was not that it produced a Manstein but that it discovered a Manstein and groomed him. In the final analysis organizations have to surrender to the judgement of one man. This can lead to both success or failure. The risk has to be taken.
b. The German General Halder well summed it up when he said “War is full of imponderables and surprises. Only a commander who can depend on his own ingenuity and that of his men will be able to make the improvisations dictated by the moment and master situations not described in the manuals”. Halder went further adding “True, in order to do this, he will have to know exactly what it is he wants to do....”. Thus Halder concluded “The attempt to find a recipe for every single situation with which the lower echelons may be confronted, occasionally results in a cut-and-dried recipee” far more detailed than is needed”.14 As a matter of fact this is the difference between the British Way of Warfare which both Indian, Pakistani and to a great extent the Bangladesh Army inherited and the German way of warfare. Thus the military failures in 1965, 1971 and later!
c. Creation of systems which assess the decision making capabilities of individuals at higher levels. In third World Countries this is severely limited by powerful interest groups, parochialism and nepotism. Then there is a kinship of higher ranks and they feel that anybody who has reached a particular rank does not require any further testing! In my thirteen years service I highlighted this anomaly in many articles published in the Citadel and Pakistan Army Journal. I don’t think that anyone in the army use to read both of these publications!
CONCLUSION
Its best to quote Clausewitz once again:-
“Searching rather than inventive minds, comprehensive rather than such as have a special bent, cool rather than fiery heads are those to which in time of War we should prefer to trust the welfare of our women and children, the honour and safety of our fatherland”.15 “Men who are difficult to move but on that account susceptible of very deep feeling”. Men the effect of whose feelings is “like the movement of a great body, slower but more irresistible”.16
End Notes
1Pages 127 & 128 -India and the World War One- Edited by S.D Pradhan -Article titled Congress Leadership in Transition by Stanley Wolpert -Columbia University-1978.
2Page-266- Fidelity and Honour-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Viking -New Delhi-1991. Taken from Bernhardi’s book Germany and the next War.
3Page-311 -Mian Fazal I Hussain-A Political Biography- Azim Hussain-London 1966.
4Quoted by Great Captains-Napoleon- Theodore Ayrault Dodge-In Four Volumes-Printed by Mifflin Company-1904-7. The remark was made by General Kellerman.
6Page-150-The Great War at Sea-1914-1918-Richard Hough-Oxford University Press-1986.
7Page-85-Ibid.
8Page-271 & 272-The German Army- Herbert Rosinki- (edited with an introduction by Gordon (Craig)- Pall Mall Press-London-1966.
9Page-260-On War-Carl Von Clausewitz-Edited By Anatol Rapoport. Pelican Books 1976. Reprinted by National Book Foundation on orders of Mr Bhutto and distributed in the army in 1976.
10 Page-198-Ibid.
11Page-182-Ibid.
12Page-140-On War-Carl Von Clausewitz-Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret-Princeton University Press-Princeton-New Jersey-1976. Reprinted by NBF under express instructions of Mr Bhutto in 1976 and distributed in the Armed Forces.
13Page-141-Ibid.
14Pages 8 & 9-Military Effectiveness-Volume Three-Allen and Unwin-USA-1988.
15Page-158 -On War edited by Rapoport.
16Page-149.Ibid.
John Kerry War Record
POSTING THIS DOES NOT MEAN ENDORSEMENT.
COMMENTS ARE WELCOME.
AGHA H AMIN
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